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Introduction
How does government spending affect the current account and the real exchange rate? Conventional wisdom-as well as mainstream macroeconomic models used by policymakers-suggests that an increase in government spending puts pressure on the domestic currency to appreciate, leading to current account deterioration (and potentially a "twin deficit") and to a decrease in consumption through an international risk-sharing condition. This mechanism holds across a wide range of models, including both New Keynesian and neoclassical models. However, empirical evidence for such a mechanism has not been settled. For example, Corsetti and Müller (2006) and Kim and Roubini (2008) find that in the U.S. data the trade balance improves after a government spending shock. In contrast, using the data for Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, Monacelli and Perotti (2010) and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012) estimate that a rise in government spending causes a trade deficit, as well as a real depreciation of the domestic currency and an increase in consumption. Given these contrasting empirical results in studies of a relatively small number of countries, several questions on the effects of government spending in an open economy remain: First, does government spending cause the domestic currency to appreciate in real terms and does it worsen the current account? Second, do the effects of government spending shocks differ across countries, especially between advanced and developing countries? Third, are there any other country characteristics, such as the exchange-rate regime or the degree of openness to trade, that can affect the transmission mechanism of government spending shocks? This paper addresses these important questions using a large dataset for 125 countries between 1989 and 2013. We provide new evidence on the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate, current account, and consumption. Importantly, we exploit the information in both advanced and developing countries to distinguish between the effects of government spending in these two groups. Our data also let us examine the differential effects of government spending depending on exchange-rate regimes and the level of trade openness. Since government spending can affect the state of the economy and vice versa, we identify government spending shocks using exogenous variation in international military spending. This approach has been used in the closedeconomy literature (Hall 2009 , Barro and Redlick 2011 , Ramey 2011 ), but remains underutilized in the open-economy literature.
We document a number of new empirical facts: First, in response to a positive government spending shock, the real exchange rate appreciates on impact, and the effect is significant up to a two-year horizon. After an increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP, the real exchange rate appreciates by over 3 percent on impact and by up to 5 percent two years after the shock.
The effect is most pronounced in countries with a flexible exchange-rate regime. Consistent with Monacelli and Perotti (2010) , we also find that the current account deteriorates significantly in response to a positive government spending shock. Consumption increases substantially, peaking at about 5 percent two years after the change in government spending.
Second, the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate and consumption are sig-nificantly different between advanced and developing countries. The real exchange rate depreciates significantly by 3 percent in advanced countries, but it appreciates by over 4 percent in developing countries. Consumption increases with government spending in developing countries, but the effect of government spending on consumption is negative and statistically insignificant in developed countries. The current account deteriorates in both groups.
To facilitate our analysis, we compile an extensive dataset for both advanced and developing countries, combining data on international military spending, total government spending, and several other important national account aggregates and macroeconomic indicators. Importantly, we gather information on periods of war, political risks, financial crises, and commodity exporters to examine how these factors may affect our estimates. Covering many countries in the dataset naturally leads to the use of annual data. The resulting dataset consists of 125 countries in the period 1989-2013, including 96 developing countries.
Our identification of government spending shocks comes from the assumption that military spending is exogenous to the state of the economy. We implement this identification strategy using the local projections method, as in Jordà (2005) . This methodology has been widely used in the literature on the effects of government spending shocks (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012, Ramey and Zubairy 2014) . Total government spending is instrumented by military spending. Hence, government spending shocks come from fluctuations in military spending that are not forecastable by the lags of output, government spending, and other controls.
Our empirical results pose a challenge for international business-cycle models to explain both developing and advanced countries. In both standard neoclassical and New Keynesian models, a rise in government spending leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate, which is consistent with our finding for developing countries but not for advanced economies. Several papers propose a solution to this exchange-rate depreciation puzzle in advanced countries. For example, Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012) add a deep habit mechanism, while Corsetti, Meier, and Müller (2012) introduce spending reversals into an otherwise standard model to generate a deprecation of the real exchange rate. However, the risk-sharing condition in these models, which implies that consumption tends to decrease when the real exchange rate appreciates, does not square well with our empirical evidence in either developing or advanced countries. In other words, our empirical results are in line with the risk-sharing puzzle documented in Backus and Smith (1993) and Kollmann (1995) . We examine two models that can potentially explain our empirical evidence: (1) a model in which hours and consumption are complements, and (2) a model with limited asset-market participation. These models have been used in the literature to explain the effects of government spending on the economy. Both extensions to a standard international business-cycle framework can generate an increase in consumption when the real exchange rate appreciates, which is consistent with the results for developing countries but not for advanced countries.
Our paper is related to the literature on the effects of fiscal policy shocks on real exchange rates and the trade balance. A number of papers, such as Kim and Roubini (2008) , Monacelli and Perotti (2010) , and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012) , examine the responses of the real exchange rate, trade balance, or current account to government spending shocks. We differ from the existing papers in several dimensions. First, these papers often identify government spending shocks using either sign restrictions or the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) assumption that government spending shocks cannot respond to output within the same quarter. In contrast, we exploit the exogeneity of military spending. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2016) also use defense spending to examine the behavior of real exchange rates, but they focus on the United States and use the variations in the daily announcements of defense spending. Second, most of these papers use a few OECD countries, whereas our sample, in addition, contains many developing countries. We note that there are two papers that use relatively large sets of countries: Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) assemble the data for 20 advanced and 22 developing countries, but focus on output. Kim (2015) studies the effects of government spending on real exchange rates, but all of the 18 countries are developed. Our paper considers a much larger set of countries, distinguishing between advanced and developing ones, and, importantly, provides external validity to the literature on the effects of spending shocks on exchange rates, using a different identification strategy. Our results for advanced countries are consistent with previous studies that document the "puzzling" fact that real exchange rates depreciate after a government-spending shock in some advanced countries. At the same time, with a large sample of developing countries, our paper suggests that the "depreciation puzzle" does not extend to developing countries. This paper is also related to the literature examining the transmission mechanism of international business-cycle models. Unlike Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012) and Enders, Müller, and Scholl (2011) , we find that the movements of real exchange rates in developing countries are consistent with the predictions of a standard international business-cycle model. However, our empirical finding for the consumption response in these countries suggests that the main mechanism within these models-in particular, the risk-sharing condition-may not hold in the data.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses our identification strategy. We summarize our dataset in Section 3. The main empirical results are presented in Section 4, along with numerous robustness checks. We compare our results with previous literature in Section 5. Section 6 shows the challenge for theoretical models to explain our empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
Econometric Specification
There are two major strategies to identify government spending shocks. One is the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) identification strategy, which relies on the assumption that government spending does not react to changes in output within the same quarter. While this strategy can be sensible for quarterly data, it restricts the sample size; the number of countries with quarterly data is small. Therefore, in our paper, we use the other identification strategy, which presumes that changes in military spending can be treated as exogenous. This strategy has been used in the closed-economy literature that exploits U.S. data (Hall 2009 , Barro and Redlick 2011 , Ramey 2011 , but it remains underutilized in the international context.
There are two compelling reasons to use military spending changes to identify exogenous government spending shocks in international data. First, military spending data are available for many countries at an annual frequency, and there are numerous episodes of significant variation over time, which makes it easier to estimate the effects of government spending precisely. Second, changes in military spending can be treated as exogenous to business cycles in many countries. Examples of large, exogenous fluctuations of military spending that took place across a number of countries include the collapse of the Soviet Union, and consequently the end of the Cold War, as well as the allies' military operations in the Middle East, such as the Gulf War or Afghanistan wars. There are also exogenous changes in military spending in developing countries. For example, at the end of the Gulf War, Bahrain increased its military spending in order to ensure the safety of its coastline. Accordingly, in our data, we observe a large increase in Bahrain's military spending in 1991-1992. Colombia also adjusted military spending throughout the mid-1990s in order to defeat a guerilla movement and to combat drug trafficking in the country. Such examples of military spending that has little to do with the current or anticipated economic performance allow us to identify government spending shocks. In support of this argument, Collier (2006) studies the differences in military spending across developing countries and concludes that the history of domestic and international conflicts, arms races with neighboring states, and vested interests of the military, which are considered exogenous to the state of the economy, are the main determinants of such differences.
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We estimate the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate and other variables of interest using Jordà's (2005) local projections method. This method has a number of advantages over the vector autoregression (VAR) approach. First, the local projections method does not constrain the shape of the impulse response function (IRF) in the way the VAR does. Given potential heterogeneity across countries in the level of development and institutions, it is important to impose as few restrictions as possible. Second, the local projections method is flexible, as the same variables do not have to be used in each equation. Third, this method allows us to account for cross-country correlations of residuals using straightforward inference. In the results section, we report standard errors clustered by country.
Specifically, we estimate the following equations: In this specification, β h measures the h-period ahead response of variable x to an increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP. In the baseline specification, the vector of controls z z z i t includes a war index and one lag of the real GDP growth rate.
The war index takes a value of 1 when country i has a conflict at time t. This war index controls for the fact that wars, on average, may have different effects on x. The lagged real GDP growth rate controls for the state of the economy. We note that Barro and Redlick (2011) advocate for using the unemployment rate lag to control for the state of the economy. In our case, controlling for lagged unemployment without lagged output growth, or in addition to lagged output growth, does not have a material effect on the results. To keep our specification parsimonious, we therefore omit unemployment from our baseline estimation. In the robustness section, we augment the baseline with time fixed effects (δ t ) and other controls such as the unemployment rate (u i t ). Finally, our war index comes from the UCDP/PRIO Armed Conflict Dataset. Gleditsch et al. (2002) and Pettersson and Wallensteen (2015) provide more detail on how they classify wars. We note that another source of the war index, the Correlates of War (CoW) project, covers the period only up to 2007; thus, we choose to use the UCDP/PRIO data to preserve sample coverage. 5 The data sources and collection are summarized in Table A1 of Appendix A. Bazzi and Blattman (2014) compare the UCDP/PRIO data with the CoW data. Besides the difference in period coverage, the UCDP/PRIO data contain more information on smaller conflicts, in particular, those with fewer than 1,000 deaths per year. 6 Advanced countries are those in the high-income group, while developing countries are in the middle-and low-income groups.
Data
deviation of the volatility is fairly large. As reported in column (7) of Table 1 , there is a positive correlation of total government spending and military spending, which we utilize for the instrumental variable estimation. On average, across all countries in the sample, the correlation is 0.23.
The average correlations of total government spending and military spending across advanced and developing countries are similar to each other. Our data exhibit several other important characteristics. For example, government spending is about as volatile as consumption. Real exchange rates are more volatile than consumption in both advanced and developing countries, a fact consistent with previous literature.
Empirical Results
This section presents the effects of changes in government spending on real exchange rates and current accounts, and compares the responses in advanced and developing countries. Since standard open-economy models make sharp predictions about the comovement of the real exchange rate with the current account and consumption, we also estimate the responses of these variables to government spending shocks.
All Countries
We first present the estimated responses of the real exchange rate, current account, and consumption to an increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP, using the full sample of 125 countries and the period between 1989 and 2013. 7 We note that government spending is persistent, with a cumulative increase of about 1.2 percent of GDP at a one-year horizon, as plotted in the top left panel of Figure 1 . Additionally, the F -statistic of the first stage is high, well above 10, suggesting that the relationship between government spending and military spending is strong.
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The top right panel of Figure 1 plots the effects of an increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP on the REER in the baseline specification. The most important result in Figure 1 is that a positive shock to government spending leads to real exchange-rate appreciation. The estimates are large and statistically significant. The response of the REER is hump-shaped and significant up to a two-year horizon. A positive government spending shock of 1 percent of GDP causes the real exchange rate to appreciate by 3.7 percent on impact, reaching its maximum of 7 percent over a one-year horizon. This result holds in several variations of Equation (1), for example, when we control for a lag of the unemployment rate.
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The bottom left plot in Figure 1 shows the response of the current account-to-GDP ratio. The current account deteriorates in response to an increase in government spending. The current accountto-output ratio decreases by 2 to 5 percentage points over a two-year horizon. The responses are 7 Appendix B provides more detail on the composition of countries and sample periods. 8 We also estimate the baseline specification using a limited information maximum likelihood (LIML) estimator. The results are similar.
9 Table C1 in Appendix C reports the results of several other estimation specifications. 
Consumption
Notes: The responses of government spending, the real exchange rate, the current account, and consumption to an increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP at horizons from 0 to 3 years. Government spending is instrumented by military spending. The dotted lines are the 90 percent confidence interval bounds. statistically significant at horizons up to two years.
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The bottom right plot of Figure 1 shows the response of consumption to government spending
shocks. An increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP leads to an increase in consumption of 2 percent on impact and of over 5 percent within two years. 
Advanced vs. Developing Countries
Next, we compare the responses of the real exchange rate, current account, and consumption in advanced and developing countries. We first estimate Equation (1) using the indicator function for each subsample. To test the difference between advanced and developing countries' responses, we estimate the following regression at each horizon h = 0, 1, 2: where I A is the indicator for advanced countries and I D is the indicator for developing countries.
The difference between the estimates for advanced and developing countries is given by β
First, the responses of real exchange rates in advanced and developing countries are substantially different from each other. As plotted in the top right panel of Figure 2 , while in developing countries the REER appreciates, advanced countries' REER depreciates at all horizons up to three years. 12 The estimates for developing countries are statistically significant at horizons up to two years, while the estimates for advanced countries are statistically significant on impact and at a two-year horizon. On impact, the REER in advanced countries depreciates by about 3 percent after an increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP. In contrast, the REER in developing countries appreciates by about 4.7 percent on impact. The depreciation in advanced countries is approximately of the same magnitude as the appreciation in developing countries within a twoyear horizon. However, in advanced countries, the REER response peaks at longer horizons than in developing countries, reaching its maximum, in absolute terms, of a 10 percent depreciation rate over a three-year horizon. Our finding that the REER depreciates in advanced countries is consistent with the previous literature that focuses on OECD countries, such as Monacelli and Perotti (2010) and Ravn, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2012) , but contradicts to a recent paper by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2016) , who find appreciation of the real exchange rate in response to an increase in military spending in the United States. However, the fact that our confidence intervals for advanced countries are relatively large suggests that there is a high degree of heterogeneity across advanced countries. Columns (1) and (2) Figure 2 . Government spending increases persistently in all countries by almost the same magnitude during the first two years; thus, government spending processes may not explain the differences in the responses across the two groups of countries.
12 As the set of developing countries in our study is fairly large, one may suspect significant heterogeneity within this category. To check this, we split developing countries into middle-and low-income groups, based on their gross national income in 2000. We do not find much support for heterogeneity. The estimates of REER responses for these two groups are similar to each other. Appendix Table C5 reports the estimates. Since the low-income countries coverage is relatively small, and real exchange rates appreciate in both low-and middle-income countries, we report the rest of the results for the two groups combined. The bottom left panel of Figure 2 shows that current accounts in both groups of countries decline substantially in response to the identified government spending shocks. In other words, both advanced and developing countries increase borrowing. The estimated response of the current account in advanced countries is less precise than that in developing countries, and its 90 percent confidence interval is wide. We also test formally the difference between the responses of the current account in advanced and developing countries. As reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 2 , the p-values of the differences exceed conventional values at all horizons, so we cannot reject the null hypothesis that there is no difference between the responses of the current accounts in advanced and developing countries.
The consumption responses in advanced countries are different from those in developing countries. As reported in the bottom right panel of Figure 2 , in advanced countries, consumption declines in response to an increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP. The decrease in consumption in advanced countries is large, about 3 percent, corresponding to a multiplier of -1 on impact. The point estimate for advanced countries is different from that in previous papers such as Monacelli and Perotti (2010) , who document an increase in consumption in a smaller number of countries. However, we note that the confidence bands of the advanced-countries estimates are wide and include zero, so it is difficult to draw a sharp conclusion about the responses of consumption in advanced countries. On the other hand, consumption increases significantly in developing countries. We report the differences in consumption responses in advanced and developing countries, as well as the p-values, in columns (5) and (6) of Table 2 . We can marginally reject the hypothesis that there is no difference between the consumption responses in the two groups of countries on impact (the p-value is 0.1). At horizons from one to three years, the differences in consumption responses in advanced and developing countries are statistically significant. 
Exchange-Rate Regimes
Since the effects of government spending can depend in theory on exchange-rate regimes, we estimate our baseline specification by grouping countries based on their exchange-rate regime. We use the Klein and Shambaugh (2008) classification to categorize exchange-rate regimes. We find that the responses of the real exchange rate, the current account, and consumption depend on an exchange-rate regime. Figure 3a shows estimates of the REER response separately for countries with fixed and flexible exchange-rate regimes. Under a fixed exchange rate, the REER response is not significantly different from zero. The same is true when we look at advanced and developing countries with a fixed exchange-rate regime: the responses of the REER in both groups are close to zero or negative, but insignificant at all considered horizons. Under a flexible exchange-rate regime, the REER response to an expansionary government spending shock is positive, similar to the baseline response. We also find that advanced countries experience a significant depreciation of real exchange rates, whereas the reverse is true for developing countries. These results suggest that the estimates of the REER response are driven by countries with a flexible exchange-rate regime. Figure 3b displays the effects of government spending shocks on the current account-to-output ratio under different exchange-rate regimes. For countries with a fixed exchange-rate regime, the current account deteriorates in response to a positive government spending shock in both the advanced and developing countries subsamples, although the responses of the current account have wide confidence intervals. In the flexible exchange-rate regime, the current account deterioration is statistically significant in the full subsample, but this result is mostly driven by the developing countries. In advanced countries with a flexible exchange-rate regime, the responses of the current account are small and positive, but not significantly different from zero at all considered horizons.
Finally, the effects of government spending changes on consumption also depend on the exchangerate regime. As plotted in Figure 3c , point estimates of the responses of consumption are positive for both advanced and developing countries under a fixed exchange-rate regime. However, the responses are not significantly different from zero. On the other hand, the responses of consumption are similar to the baseline results when we restrict our attention to countries with a flexible exchange-rate regime only. In particular, consumption rises, on average. However, consumption increases only in developing countries, while it decreases in advanced countries under a flexible 
(c) Consumption
Notes: The responses of the real exchange rate, current account, and consumption to an increase in government spending of 1 percent of GDP, by exchange-rate regimes. The dotted and dashed lines are the 90 percent confidence interval bounds.
exchange-rate regime. This result, together with the results on the real exchange rate, suggests that our baseline results are disproportionately influenced by countries with a flexible exchange-rate regime. 
Openness to Trade
To examine whether the level of openness to trade affects the response of real exchange rates and current accounts to government spending shocks, we re-estimate the baseline specification using subgroups of countries based on the combined shares of exports and imports in GDP. Following Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013), we calculate the average trade share in GDP for each country over the entire sample period. If the average trade share is above 60 percent of GDP, the country is classified as open.
15 Figure 4 displays the responses of the real exchange rate, current account-to- 14 We note that the sizes of the samples of advanced countries under a fixed exchange-rate regime and of those under a flexible exchange-rate regime are similar to each other. The detailed results including the sample sizes and the F -statistics of the corresponding first-stage regressions are tabulated in Appendix Table C7 . 15 The results in this section do not change if we choose the classification based on the trade share at the midpoint of the sample period. Our results differ somewhat from the previous literature. Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) report that that fiscal multipliers are larger in closed economies than in open economies. However, 16 Appendix Table C8 
Robustness Checks
This section examines important cases that can affect our baseline results. In particular, we analyze whether wars, financial crises, commodity prices, and the type of military spending can significantly influence our baseline results. We also show that our results are robust to adding potentially important controls to the regression.
Wars Our identification strategy relies on the fact that changes in military spending, especially those related to wars far from domestic soil, can be considered exogenous. However, this identification strategy may not work for wars associated with major human and capital losses. Although we drop from our baseline sample several countries with a long history of civil wars, such as Angola, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka, and then control for the average effects of wars, it is still possible that the baseline results are driven by special war periods in other countries in the sample. To address this possibility, we estimate Equation (1) excluding all war observations. Since the UCDP/PRIO war index includes both large conflicts, with more than 1,000 deaths a year, and small conflicts, with fewer than 1,000 deaths a year, and the index also captures civil wars as well as international border disputes, our exclusion of all war periods is conservative. 17 The first three columns of Table 3 present the results for real exchange rates, current accounts, and consumption in this restricted sample. In general, the baseline results are robust. We find that while real exchange rates appreciate in developing countries at all considered horizons, the evidence from advanced countries is not conclusive, as the point estimates are not significant at conventional levels. Current accounts deteriorate in both groups of countries, and the estimates are statistically significant up to a one-year horizon. Consumption in developing countries increases significantly, in contrast to the negative and insignificant response in advanced countries.
18
Financial Crises Financial crises may also affect the exogeneity of military spending. Since our large dataset includes several financial crisis episodes, we examine whether excluding these observations affects our results. The crisis dates are taken from Reinhart and Rogoff (2011) . Similar to 17 We note that the majority of wars in the dataset are civil wars. There are few international border disputes (three observations), and since small disputes can lead to exogenous changes in military spending, we only exclude international border disputes with more than 1,000 deaths a year. 18 In another robustness check, we exclude from our sample all countries with at least 10 years of civil war. These countries are Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Nepal, Peru, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and Uganda. The results are similar to the baseline, as shown in Appendix Table C9 . Notes: This table reports the response of the real exchange rate, current account-to-GDP ratio, and consumption to an expansionary g shock of 1 percent of GDP. "Adv" denotes the advanced-countries sample, "Dev" denotes the developing-countries sample. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending. In the first three columns, we drop countries at war from the sample. In the next three columns, we do the same for financial crises periods. Results in columns (7) to (9) (4)- (6) of Table 3 . Most of the baseline results carry through. For example, current accounts decrease in all countries. The real exchange rate appreciates in developing countries, although the estimates are less precise, possibly due to a much smaller number of observations. One difference from the baseline result is that consumption increases significantly in advanced countries at one-and twoyear horizons, whereas consumption decreases insignificantly in the baseline. This result suggests that there might be a large degree of heterogeneity across advanced countries. Since the number of observations falls tremendously when we drop the observations with financial crises, we also examine a case where we control for the effects of financial crises by adding a dummy variable to the baseline specification. The results of this case, reported in Appendix Table C10 , are in line with the baseline estimates.
Commodity Exporters
Another concern about our dataset is that many countries are major commodity exporters, whose public budgets and military spending may depend on commodity prices.
For example, Chile's Copper Law mandates that 10 percent of the country's export revenues from copper be spent on the military. As a result, higher copper prices may lead to an increase in military spending that coincides with real exchange-rate appreciation, the strengthening of the current account, and an increase in consumption. We, therefore, exclude from our sample countries where the median share of commodities in total exports is above 50 percent. 19 In total, we exclude 38 countries. These countries are major exporters of oil (Nigeria, Russia, Saudi Arabia, United Arab
Emirates, Venezuela), metals (Chile, copper), food (Burundi, coffee beans; Paraguay, soy beans), and other commodities (Burkina Faso, cotton). The results are presented in columns (7) to (9) of Table 3 , and are mostly in accord with the benchmark. This exclusion restriction is conservative.
When we use a stronger exclusion criterion of having the share of exported oil and metals above 15 percent of GDP, the results are even closer to the baseline (Table C12 in the appendix).
Military Imports
We also explore the role of military imports in the transmission mechanism of fiscal policy. Standard macroeconomic models give robust predictions about the exchange-rate effects of an increase in government spending directed to domestic products. This exercise is consistent with the common practice of spending public money on domestic infrastructure, health care, education, and so on. The military budgets of many countries, however, have a significant component of spending directed to foreign goods, since relatively few countries produce arms and military 19 To measure the commodities share in total exports, we use two data sources: (1) the U.N. Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), and (2) Comtrade database. Despite some differences between the two datasets, the resulting lists of commodity exporters are almost identical. In two cases, the share is above 50 percent in Comtrade but not in UNCTAD (Indonesia, Nicaragua), and in one case, the opposite is true (the United Arab Emirates). To be conservative, these three countries are among the excluded 38 countries. The full list of excluded commodity exporters can be found in Appendix Table C11 . equipment themselves. In theory, when the government demands more foreign goods than domestic goods, the price of foreign goods relative to the price of domestic goods increases, so the real exchange rate depreciates. The reverse is true if the government demands more domestic goods.
To understand whether such alternative mechanisms can explain our results, we merge our (10) to (12), we exclude all countries with a fraction of over 25 percent in an average year. 21 The results of this exercise confirm our baseline findings.
As another check, we investigate what components of military spending contribute to the shocks.
The SIPRI data allow grouping military spending into four categories: equipment, infrastructure, personnel, and operational expenses. It is customary to treat the first two categories as consumption of durables, and the last two as nondurables. In our context, spending on nondurables is much more likely to have an effect domestically than spending on durables, which may be directed largely abroad. We then estimate the responses of these two components to an increase in military spending. 22 The results plotted in Figure 5 suggest that not only durable but also nondurable military spending increases; thus, it is unlikely that military imports drive the results.
20 Figure C2 in the appendix plots the distribution of the average shares of arms imports in military spending in the full sample.
21 These countries are Bahrain, Canada, Cape Verde, Egypt, Georgia, Guyana, Israel, Jordan, Laos, Luxembourg, Mexico, the Seychelles, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates. The results are the same if we set the threshold at 40 percent, if we use the median share, or we drop countries with at least one annual share above 70 percent (Appendix Table C13 ). These thresholds also cut off the countries where arms deliveries in one year exceed 100 percent of military spending. 22 Essentially, this strategy produces a decomposition of the military spending shock into durable and nondurable components.
International Aid In many developing countries, government spending is funded to some extent by foreign aid. Aid-financed government spending may lead to effects different from tax-or debtfinanced government spending. For example, the wealth effect may be negligible in this case, since government spending due to aid does not lead to higher taxes in the present or in the future, nor does it affect consumers' expectations. To address this issue, we test the sensitivity of our results to dropping from the baseline sample countries that receive a significant amount of aid. As the data on bilateral aid are not available for a large number of countries, we drop countries that receive substantial aid from World Bank development projects. Using internal World Bank data, Kraay (2012) identifies 29 countries that received substantial aid in the period 1985-2009, which roughly matches our sample period. Table C14 in the appendix presents the estimates of our baseline equation when we drop 21 of such countries that are also present in our sample.
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Anticipated Spending One potential concern about our methodology is that we do not explicitly control for anticipated changes in military spending, which can have different effects on the economy compared with unanticipated changes. Since our sample consists of over a hundred countries, obtaining a forecast measure of military spending is difficult. However, we attempt to control for anticipated changes in military spending by adding a measure of political risks to the control variables. We use the political risk index from The International Country Risk Guide, which has published monthly data for over 140 countries since 1980. The index rates a country in a given period based on the assessment of external and internal risks, as well as the degree of military influence in the government. A higher risk rating may indicate that people expect military spending to change in the future. We include this index in the control set and re-estimate Equation (1). The first three columns of Table 4 suggest that our results are robust to adding this control variable.
Monetary Policy and Common Shocks
Our next robustness exercises pertain to the roles monetary policy, interest rates, and common shocks play in fiscal transmission. First, since monetary policy can affect the transmission mechanism of government spending shocks, we add a policy rate to our baseline specification, and re-estimate the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate, current account, and consumption. Columns (4)- (6) of Table 4 present the results.
Quantitatively, the baseline results stand, although the confidence intervals become wider. Second, to address the possibility that there are common shocks affecting the world economy, we include time fixed-effects in the control variables and re-estimate Equation (1). The results in the last three columns of Table 4 are similar to the baseline results. Third, since the 2008 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), nominal interest rates have remained at, or close to, zero in many countries. Naturally, there is a concern that the responses of the REER, consumption, and the current account to government spending shocks could change around 2008. To address this possibility, we produce estimates Notes: This table reports the response of the real exchange rate, current account-to-GDP ratio, and consumption to an expansionary g shock of 1 percent of GDP. "Adv" denotes the advanced-countries sample, "Dev" denotes the developing-countries sample. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending. In the first three columns, we add the nominal policy rate to control for the monetary policy stance. In the next three columns, we control for political risks rating in each country. In the last three columns, we control for time fixed effects.
of the responses in the period 1989-2007, excluding the GFC and its aftermath. Table C15 in the appendix shows that our results for the REER, consumption, and the current account are not affected by the recent episode of the Great Recession and the zero lower bound. The estimates are statistically significant and quantitatively similar to the baseline.
Comparison with Previous Literature
We compare our results with those of Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) and Kim (2015) , two studies that examine relatively large panels of countries. Although Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) focus primarily on the size of fiscal multipliers, their empirical strategy employs a VAR in (2013) and Kim (2015) . "Adv" denotes the advancedcountries sample, "Dev" denotes the developing-countries sample. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending.
four variables (g, y, REER, and CA), which generates the response of the REER to government spending shocks, reported in the paper as well. Their results are somewhat inconclusive due to wide confidence intervals, and-if anything-they support REER depreciation over long horizons.
To make sure that the difference between our results and theirs is not due to country coverage, columns (1) to (3) in Table 5 report the estimates of the REER response for the case when our methodology is applied to the sample that matches theirs as closely as possible. 24 We find that real exchange rates depreciate in advanced economies, consistent with both our baseline results and theirs. The difference is that our procedure applied to the developing-countries sample implies real exchange-rate appreciation at most horizons. Yet, the estimates have wide confidence bands.
We also estimate our baseline specification in the sample that matches the 18 countries analyzed in Kim (2015) . 25 Kim (2015) also identifies government spending shocks using government consumption data and the Blanchard and Perotti (2002) strategy, and finds that real exchange rates depreciate and the current account improves over time. We report the estimated responses of real exchange rates using Kim's sample and our identification strategy in column (4) of Table 5 . Consistent with his paper, we find that real exchange rates depreciate. The main difference with his paper is that the current account deteriorates in our case.
To summarize, we find some differences between the results in this paper and in the two previous studies even when we control for sample composition. Therefore, we conclude that sample composition is unlikely to drive these differences. Furthermore, the wide confidence bands found in the case when we restrict the sample to be similar to the previous studies suggest that it is important to pool the information from many countries, as we do in this paper. 24 We match their sample fairly well. We have military spending data for all countries in their study, except Iceland. The only caveat is that our sample period for Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States starts at 1989, while theirs goes back to the 1960s, except for France (1976) . For the other 38 (out of 44) countries, we have the same coverage. We also exclude observations after 2008 to match their sample period. 25 Kim's sample includes only advanced countries and is a subset of Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Végh (2013) in the period from 1981 to 2010. We match his sample fairly well, again except for Australia, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
Empirical Facts vs. Theory
This section discusses the challenges for international business-cycle models to explain our empirical evidence in both advanced and developing countries. We first compare the empirical findings with the predictions of standard international business-cycle models, which have been widely used in the literature, as in Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992) The basic structure of the model features two countries, Home (H) and Foreign (F), and two goods, with each country specializing in one of the goods. Consumer preferences have a home bias. The asset markets are complete. 26 The model implies the following relationship between consumption and the real exchange rate:
where U i c with i = {H, F } denotes the marginal utility of consumption in the Home and Foreign country, respectively, and q is the real exchange rate. We note that an increase in q represents currency appreciation, consistent with our empirical exercise. The standard separable utility function is of the form:
where C and L are consumption and labor, respectively, σ is the relative risk aversion parameter, and v is related to the labor supply elasticity. With this assumption, Equation (3) can be written as,
where C and C * denote consumption in the Home and Foreign country, respectively. This risksharing condition implies that an increase in home consumption relative to foreign consumption is associated with real exchange-rate depreciation. Additionally, the negative wealth effect associated with an increase in government spending depresses consumption. This model with complete asset markets predicts a decline in consumption, real exchange-rate appreciation, and a trade-balance deterioration.
While the behavior of the current account in the data is consistent with the model, the empirical responses of real exchange rates do not necessarily provide support for the model. In advanced countries, real exchange rates depreciate in the data, in contrast to the model. This is the "real exchange-rate puzzle" documented in the previous literature (see Monacelli and Perotti 2010) .
Additionally, the real exchange-rate-consumption relationship in the risk-sharing condition, Equa-tion (5), fails: the model predicts a negative relationship between real exchange-rate appreciation and consumption, whereas the data for advanced countries support a positive relationship. In developing countries, we find no "real exchange-rate puzzle," as real exchange rates appreciate after an increase in government spending, as predicted by the model. However, similar to its behavior in advanced countries, the risk-sharing condition fails in developing countries: consumption increases, whereas the model predicts a decline in consumption. Overall, our empirical evidence does not lend support to standard models with complete asset markets.
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The above analyses suggest that as long as the model generates the risk-sharing condition of Equation (5), it cannot be reconciled with the empirical evidence. For example, Ravn, SchmittGrohé, and Uribe (2012) augment standard models with deep habits to generate a real exchangerate depreciation consistent with advanced countries, but their mechanism cannot explain all the empirical findings in either advanced countries or developing countries because it produces a real exchange-rate-consumption relationship similar to Equation (5). In other words, when the real exchange rate depreciates in that model, consumption increases, whereas consumption responses are negative and insignificant in the data for advanced countries.
We now discuss two common fixes for standard models in the literature that can alter the risksharing condition: (i) nonseparable preferences with consumption and hours as complements, and
(ii) limited asset-market participation. Both fixes can help to reconcile the model with the empirical evidence in developing countries but not in advanced countries.
First, nonseparable preferences with no wealth effects, such as in Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) , can potentially generate responses of the real exchange rate and consumption consistent with the responses in the developing-countries data because, with no wealth effects, consumption can increase in response to an increase in government spending shocks. Furthermore, the risk-sharing condition in Equation (3) depends not only on consumption, but also on hours
Therefore, the model can predict simultaneously an appreciation of the real exchange rate and an increase in consumption, consistent with the evidence for developing countries.
Second, an extension of the model with limited asset-market participation from a closed-economy setting (Galí, López-Salido, and Vallés 2007) to an open-economy setting can also explain the responses of the real exchange rate and consumption consistent with the developing countries' results.
Specifically, in the model, a fraction of households 1 − λ have no access to financial markets, and so their budget constraint looks as follows: 27 We also examine the model with incomplete asset markets, in which agents can hold a one-period noncontingent bond. The theoretical predictions are broadly in line with the complete asset-markets case.
where C n is consumption, L n is labor, T n is taxes levied on households with no asset-market access, and W is the wage. In this model, consumption of these "hand-to-mouth" households increases after an increase in government spending. At the same time, the risk-sharing condition holds only for households with asset-market access:
where C a and C * a denote consumption of households with the access to asset markets in the Home and Foreign country, respectively. With the standard utility function, consumption responses of these households are similar to those in standard models (that is, consumption of households with assetmarket access declines). Real exchange rates, in turn, appreciate due to the risk-sharing condition.
Aggregate consumption in the economy is given by C = λC a + (1 − λ) C n ; thus, as long as λ is sufficiently large, aggregate consumption can increase, consistent with the empirical findings for developing countries. These two models, however, can generate consumption increases with a currency appreciation, but they cannot generate both a decrease in consumption and a currency depreciation.
Overall, our analysis suggests that these two additional features proposed in the literature may be able to explain our findings in developing countries, but not in advanced countries. These results call for a model that can explain the effects of government spending on the real exchange rate separately in advanced and developing countries.
Concluding Remarks
The effects of government spending in an open-economy environment are still not well understood.
The workhorse open-economy models fail to match basic empirical regularities, giving rise to prominent "puzzles" in the international economics literature. These empirical regularities, in turn, are based on data from only a few, mostly advanced, economies. With a unique dataset covering a large number of countries, we contribute to a better understanding of the fiscal policy effects, not only in advanced, but also in developing countries. We provide external validity for two specific puzzles: (1) real currency depreciation in response to an expansionary government spending shock in advanced countries; and (2) violation of the risk-sharing condition in response to government spending shocks. We also investigate the role of development, exchange-rate regimes, and trade openness in the international transmission mechanism of fiscal policy.
We document new facts and reach a key conclusion: significant variation in specific economic conditions and institutional environments across countries leads to very different responses to fiscal shocks of exchange rates, consumption, and current accounts. Therefore, one cannot easily extend evidence from the United States or OECD countries to less-developed economies. Specifically, we emphasize that although some regularities, such as the consumption-exchange-rate puzzle and the decline in current accounts conditional on government spending shocks, hold uniformly across groups of countries, other puzzles hold only in developed countries (real depreciation). These data regularities are most pronounced under a flexible exchange-rate regime; in a fixed exchangerate regime, the responses of the real exchange rate, consumption, and the current account are somewhat subdued. We show that pooled estimates of the responses can be quantitatively large (when a broad panel of countries is considered) and that there is considerable heterogeneity across countries. Finally, our paper suggests that using variation in military spending can be a promising strategy to identify and to quantify the effects of fiscal policy around the world.
Our results call for more research on the role of country-specific institutional arrangements in the transmission and propagation of fiscal shocks, and for more use of macro data from developing countries.
It remains an open question whether this result can be achieved within a unified model under different, country-specific calibrations or whether, instead, one needs completely separate models. We also encourage more diversity in data sources used to estimate the effect of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables.
Appendix

A Data
Annual data on military spending are available for 160 countries during 1989-2013, with 3,312 total observations. We use the number of years for which these data are available to proxy for the reliability of the data for a particular country. For this reason, we exclude 29 countries that have fewer than 15 observations for changes in military spending. 1 We also exclude Kuwait, as the country exhibited unusually large swings in military spending growth rates during and after the Gulf War. Our inclusion criteria also weed out countries that had significant wars (both in terms of severity and duration) on domestic soil, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Sudan, leaving us with a sample of relatively stable countries without drastic fluctuations in economic activity and military spending. For similar reasons, we also drop Angola, Pakistan, Rwanda, and Sri Lanka. The final sample contains 125 countries (29 advanced countries and 96 developing ones according to the World Bank 2000 classification) and 2,766 observations in total. Table A1 contains information on the countries available in the entire sample, as well as the number of observations available per country for our variables. The following is a detailed summary of the data used in our analysis and the relevant sources. Military Spending Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) reports data on total military expenditure at constant 2011 prices in U.S. dollars for 171 countries in 1988-2013. We calculate total military spending by using SIPRI's military spending-to-GDP ratio, which is available for 164 countries in the same period. More specifically, in order to compute a total military spending series at constant 2005 prices in national currency units, we multiply this ratio by real GDP obtained from the UN. SIPRI calculates the ratio of military spending to GDP in domestic currency at current prices for calendar years, where nominal GDP in Trade Balance We compute countries' trade balances using data on exports and imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP from the World Bank's WDI database. We use the October 2015 version of the database, which has annual data for 195 countries and territories from 1960 to 2014. The exports and imports series are collected from the World Bank and the OECD national accounts data. These series exclude compensation of employees, investment income, and transfer payments. 8 The WDI database provides a trade-balance series as well, called "Net trade in goods and services," which we do not use, because it is expressed in current U.S. dollars, thereby reflecting fluctuations in the exchange rate. Computing the trade balance as a percentage of GDP allows us to measure the trade balance at constant 2005 prices in national currency units. Overall, our dataset contains trade-balance data for 125 countries in the period 1989-2013.
Unemployment Rate
We obtain unemployment rate data from the World Bank's WDI database. The World Bank collects the unemployment series from the International Labor Organization. 9 Annual unemployment rates are available for 174 countries from 1991 to 2013. Our final sample contains labor data for 123 countries (29 advanced and 94 developing) during the 1991-2013 period. 10 We use the October 2015 edition of the database.
Government Debt The IMF's Fiscal Affairs Department compiled a comprehensive database (Historical Public Debt), with data for 178 countries (as well as certain groups, such as Emerging Markets, G-20, and so on) from 1875 to 2012.
11 The data are available at an annual frequency, and gross government debt is reported as a median percentage of GDP. The IMF constructs their dataset using a variety of sources, including statistical handbooks, official government publications, and other databases compiled by researchers and independent organizations. An earlier version of the data was used in an IMF working paper expanding upon work in Chapter 3 of the October 2012 edition of the IMF WEO.
12 In our sample, we have debt-to-GDP ratios for 125 countries from 1989 to 2012. This dataset is an extended version of the historical debt data used in Pescatori, Sandri, and Simon (2014).
Wars, Taxes, Interest Rates, Exchange Rate Regimes Data on wars, marginal tax rates, interest rates, and exchange-rate regime classifications are as followed. The data on wars are from the Correlates of War (COW) project. The dataset contains information on participating countries, start and end dates, and the number of battle deaths for each conflict, up to 2007. Annual marginal tax rates are taken from the OECD Central Government Personal Income Tax Rates and Thresholds dataset for 33 OECD countries in the period 1981-2014. We choose the top marginal income tax rate as our preferred measure. We further augment this measure with marginal income tax rates provided by KPMG, a Big Four auditor, for both advanced and developing countries during 2006-2014. End-of-period policy rates and discount rates are collected from Haver Analytics and the IMF's IFS database. Exchange-rate regime classifications are based on the IMF, Shambaugh (2004) , Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2005) , Klein and Shambaugh (2008) , and Ilzetzki, Reinhart, and Rogoff (2009) . In our analysis, we use the Klein and Shambaugh (2008) classification as the baseline.
Other Control Variables
We also explore robustness of our results to the degree of political risk, commodity exports, military imports, financial crises, and international aid. The data sources for these control variables are summarized in Table A1 . Notes: This table reports the response of the current account-to-output ratio to an increase in g of 1 percent of GDP. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending. The column with a superscript b shows the baseline results. Table C3 . Net Exports-to-GDP Ratio Response Notes: This table reports the response of the net exports-to-output ratio to an increase in g of 1 percent of GDP. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending. The superscript b denotes our baseline specification. Notes: This table reports the response of top marginal tax rate, government debt-to-GDP ratio, and inflation to an increase in g of 1 percent of GDP. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending. We estimate the baseline specification for the sample between 1989 and 2007. The results are similar to the results with other specifications. Notes: This table reports the response of the REER (Panel A), current account-to-GDP ratio (Panel B), and consumption, in percent (Panel C) to an increase in g shock of 1 percent of GDP by exchange-rate regimes, using the baseline specification. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending.
B Baseline Sample
xii Notes: This table reports the response of the REER (Panel A), current account-to-GDP ratio (Panel B), and consumption, in percent (Panel C) to an increase in g shock of 1 percent of GDP by trade openness, using the baseline specification. A country is open if its total trade share in GDP exceeds 60 percent. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending. Notes: This table reports the response of the real exchange rate, current account-to-GDP ratio, and consumption (in percent) to an increase in g of 1 percent of GDP. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending. We estimate the baseline specification for the sample excluding countries with at least 10 years of wars. These countries are Algeria, Burundi, Chad, Colombia, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Nepal, Peru, Pakistan, the Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Thailand, Turkey, and Uganda. The results are similar to those from other specifications. Notes: This table reports the response of the real exchange rate, current account-to-GDP ratio, and consumption (in percent) to an increase in g of 1 percent of GDP when we control for financial crises. The g shocks are constructed using military spending as an instrument for total government spending. 
